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Chapter 1 — Traditional VPN & Branch Architecture: Problems & Drivers

This chapter traces how enterprise networking evolved from a simple, centralised model to a patchwork of expensive workarounds — and why cloud adoption finally broke it beyond repair.


The Hub-and-Spoke Model

All traffic routes through a central HQ or data centre. Every branch and remote user is a "spoke" that backhauled to the "hub" for both applications and security inspection.

graph TD
    HQ["🏢 HQ / Data Centre<br/>Apps · Security · Internet Egress"]

    B1["🏬 Branch A"]
    B2["🏬 Branch B"]
    U1["💻 Remote User"]

    B1 -->|MPLS / site-to-site IPSec| HQ
    B2 -->|MPLS / site-to-site IPSec| HQ
    U1 -->|VPN Tunnel| HQ
    HQ --> Internet["🌐 Internet / SaaS"]

Why it worked — when these assumptions held true: - All applications lived in the data centre - Users worked mostly in offices on managed devices - Sensitive data stayed inside the corporate perimeter - Security could be enforced at a single choke point


Traditional VPN Architecture

Remote users and branches connected via:

  • IPSec VPN / SSL VPN — user establishes an encrypted tunnel to a VPN concentrator at HQ; traffic is inspected on-premises before forwarding to the app
  • Site-to-site IPSec tunnels — branch router creates a permanent tunnel to HQ firewalls
  • MPLS circuits — dedicated private WAN links with managed QoS; expensive but predictable

In all cases, traffic never left the private path until it had passed through the centralised security stack.


Why the Model Broke Down

1 — Performance: The Trombone Effect

When the VPN gateway is in New York but the user is in Singapore and the SaaS app is in Asia, every request makes a needless transatlantic round trip.

sequenceDiagram
    participant U as User (Singapore)
    participant VPN as VPN Gateway (New York)
    participant APP as M365 (Asia DC)

    U->>VPN: 1. Encrypted tunnel (~150ms)
    VPN->>APP: 2. Inspect + forward (~150ms)
    APP-->>VPN: 3. Response (~150ms)
    VPN-->>U: 4. Return to user (~150ms)
    Note right of VPN: ~600ms total<br/>vs <20ms direct

2 — Security: Implicit Trust

  • VPN connects users inside the perimeter — broad lateral access is granted on authentication
  • A compromised credential means an attacker can move freely across internal segments
  • Split-tunnelling (introduced to ease the backhaul load) leaves direct internet traffic uninspected

3 — Scalability

  • VPN concentrators are fixed-capacity hardware appliances
  • Doubling the remote workforce (e.g. COVID-19 lockdowns) requires procurement, shipping, and racking of new hardware — weeks, not hours

4 — Resiliency

  • Single centralised gateway = single point of failure
  • Redundancy doubles hardware cost and complexity without eliminating outage risk

5 — Cost

  • MPLS pricing scales linearly with the number of branches
  • Per-megabit cost is 10–50× higher than commodity internet
  • Indefensible when branches primarily need SaaS access, not private app access

Branch Architecture Evolution

Enterprises tried several phases to reduce cost and latency while preserving security:

Phase Architecture Problem it Caused
Pure MPLS All traffic hairpins via HQ High latency + high cost for SaaS
MPLS + DIA Internet breaks out locally; apps via MPLS Local DIA is unprotected or weakly protected
MPLS offload + IPSec Broadband supplements MPLS Complex dual-path routing; still backhauling
MPLS + SD-WAN SD-WAN at branch for intelligent path selection Security inspection still centralised at HQ
flowchart TD
    A["Pure MPLS<br/>(secure, slow, expensive)"]
    B["MPLS + DIA<br/>(cheaper, blind spot)"]
    C["MPLS + IPSec<br/>(complex dual path)"]
    D["MPLS + SD-WAN<br/>(smarter WAN,<br/>same security problem)"]
    E["☁️ SASE<br/>(security at the edge)"]

    A --> B --> C --> D --> E

Each step improved one dimension (cost or performance) while adding complexity — none solved the root problem: security inspection stayed centralised while users and apps became distributed.


The Tipping Point: Cloud & SaaS

The final blow to the hub-and-spoke model:

  • SaaS dominance (M365, Salesforce, Workday) — routing Tokyo → New York → Microsoft Asia for inspection is both slow and wasteful
  • IaaS adoption (AWS, Azure, GCP) — "the app is in the data centre" is no longer true; apps span multiple cloud regions
  • Remote-first workforces — the majority of traffic originates outside the office perimeter

The perimeter ceased to exist as a meaningful security boundary. Gartner coined SASE in 2019 to describe the only logical response: move security enforcement to the cloud, as close as possible to users and applications.


Key Takeaways

  • Hub-and-spoke worked well when apps, users, and data were centralised — that world is gone
  • VPN fails on performance (trombone), security (implicit trust), scale (hardware limits), and cost (MPLS)
  • Every branch architecture phase improved economics or QoS without fixing the centralised-inspection problem
  • Cloud and SaaS adoption made backhauling traffic architecturally incoherent
  • The answer is to move security inspection to where the users and applications actually are — the cloud edge

Next: Chapter 2 — The Perimeter Is Now Everywhere: SASE Concepts & Key Components