Chapter 1 — Traditional VPN & Branch Architecture: Problems & Drivers
This chapter traces how enterprise networking evolved from a simple, centralised model to a patchwork of expensive workarounds — and why cloud adoption finally broke it beyond repair.
The Hub-and-Spoke Model
All traffic routes through a central HQ or data centre. Every branch and remote user is a "spoke" that backhauled to the "hub" for both applications and security inspection.
graph TD
HQ["🏢 HQ / Data Centre<br/>Apps · Security · Internet Egress"]
B1["🏬 Branch A"]
B2["🏬 Branch B"]
U1["💻 Remote User"]
B1 -->|MPLS / site-to-site IPSec| HQ
B2 -->|MPLS / site-to-site IPSec| HQ
U1 -->|VPN Tunnel| HQ
HQ --> Internet["🌐 Internet / SaaS"]
Why it worked — when these assumptions held true: - All applications lived in the data centre - Users worked mostly in offices on managed devices - Sensitive data stayed inside the corporate perimeter - Security could be enforced at a single choke point
Traditional VPN Architecture
Remote users and branches connected via:
- IPSec VPN / SSL VPN — user establishes an encrypted tunnel to a VPN concentrator at HQ; traffic is inspected on-premises before forwarding to the app
- Site-to-site IPSec tunnels — branch router creates a permanent tunnel to HQ firewalls
- MPLS circuits — dedicated private WAN links with managed QoS; expensive but predictable
In all cases, traffic never left the private path until it had passed through the centralised security stack.
Why the Model Broke Down
1 — Performance: The Trombone Effect
When the VPN gateway is in New York but the user is in Singapore and the SaaS app is in Asia, every request makes a needless transatlantic round trip.
sequenceDiagram
participant U as User (Singapore)
participant VPN as VPN Gateway (New York)
participant APP as M365 (Asia DC)
U->>VPN: 1. Encrypted tunnel (~150ms)
VPN->>APP: 2. Inspect + forward (~150ms)
APP-->>VPN: 3. Response (~150ms)
VPN-->>U: 4. Return to user (~150ms)
Note right of VPN: ~600ms total<br/>vs <20ms direct
2 — Security: Implicit Trust
- VPN connects users inside the perimeter — broad lateral access is granted on authentication
- A compromised credential means an attacker can move freely across internal segments
- Split-tunnelling (introduced to ease the backhaul load) leaves direct internet traffic uninspected
3 — Scalability
- VPN concentrators are fixed-capacity hardware appliances
- Doubling the remote workforce (e.g. COVID-19 lockdowns) requires procurement, shipping, and racking of new hardware — weeks, not hours
4 — Resiliency
- Single centralised gateway = single point of failure
- Redundancy doubles hardware cost and complexity without eliminating outage risk
5 — Cost
- MPLS pricing scales linearly with the number of branches
- Per-megabit cost is 10–50× higher than commodity internet
- Indefensible when branches primarily need SaaS access, not private app access
Branch Architecture Evolution
Enterprises tried several phases to reduce cost and latency while preserving security:
| Phase | Architecture | Problem it Caused |
|---|---|---|
| Pure MPLS | All traffic hairpins via HQ | High latency + high cost for SaaS |
| MPLS + DIA | Internet breaks out locally; apps via MPLS | Local DIA is unprotected or weakly protected |
| MPLS offload + IPSec | Broadband supplements MPLS | Complex dual-path routing; still backhauling |
| MPLS + SD-WAN | SD-WAN at branch for intelligent path selection | Security inspection still centralised at HQ |
flowchart TD
A["Pure MPLS<br/>(secure, slow, expensive)"]
B["MPLS + DIA<br/>(cheaper, blind spot)"]
C["MPLS + IPSec<br/>(complex dual path)"]
D["MPLS + SD-WAN<br/>(smarter WAN,<br/>same security problem)"]
E["☁️ SASE<br/>(security at the edge)"]
A --> B --> C --> D --> E
Each step improved one dimension (cost or performance) while adding complexity — none solved the root problem: security inspection stayed centralised while users and apps became distributed.
The Tipping Point: Cloud & SaaS
The final blow to the hub-and-spoke model:
- SaaS dominance (M365, Salesforce, Workday) — routing Tokyo → New York → Microsoft Asia for inspection is both slow and wasteful
- IaaS adoption (AWS, Azure, GCP) — "the app is in the data centre" is no longer true; apps span multiple cloud regions
- Remote-first workforces — the majority of traffic originates outside the office perimeter
The perimeter ceased to exist as a meaningful security boundary. Gartner coined SASE in 2019 to describe the only logical response: move security enforcement to the cloud, as close as possible to users and applications.
Key Takeaways
- Hub-and-spoke worked well when apps, users, and data were centralised — that world is gone
- VPN fails on performance (trombone), security (implicit trust), scale (hardware limits), and cost (MPLS)
- Every branch architecture phase improved economics or QoS without fixing the centralised-inspection problem
- Cloud and SaaS adoption made backhauling traffic architecturally incoherent
- The answer is to move security inspection to where the users and applications actually are — the cloud edge
Next: Chapter 2 — The Perimeter Is Now Everywhere: SASE Concepts & Key Components